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Table 1: Indices of statutory independence
Reference	Independence of what from whom?	Clusters/nodes	Non-exhaustive list of items	Item response type	Aggregation method
Gilardi (2002)	IRAs from politicians	Agency head (6); Agency board (6); Relationship with gov’t, parl’t. (4); Financial, organizationalautonomy (4); Exclusive  competence (1)	Agency head cluster include items on term length,  appointing body, dismissal, incompatibility, renewability, and requirement for independence	Dichotomous: 3; polytomous: 18; median number of response categories 4	Mean of node scores
Elgie and McMenamin (2002)	Agencies from politicians	Agency head (4); Agency board (4); Regulatory competencies (5)	Agency head and Agency board cluster as per Gilardi, less incompatibility and independence items	Dichotomous: 5 (all relating to competences); Polytomous: 8 	Mean of appointments node scores, plus competencies node score, divided by two
Cukierman et al (1992)	Central banks from governments	Central bank head (4); Regulatory competences vis-a-vis govt (3); Central bank objectives (1); Limitations on lending (8)	Agency head cluster as per Gilardi, less renewability and independence items	Dichotomous: 2; Polytomous: 14; median number of response categories 4	Arbitrarily-weighted mean
Smithey and Ishiyama (2002)	Courts from politicians	None – flat structure (6) 	No. actors involved in appointment; term length, dismissal provisions; org. autonomy, presence of a priori review; decisions irreversible or not	Dichotomous: 2; Polytomous: 4; median number of response categories 3	Mean of item scores




Table 2:	Models of delegation












Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * indicates significance at p < 0.05
 

